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2Carl E. Walsh·
This article examines the relationship between the money supply and
inflation during the periodfrom 1976to 1984 when monetarypolicy was
generally framed in terms oftarget growth ranges for M1. Empirical
evidence suggests that money supply disturbances were notan important
source ofinflation volatility, but that the Federal Reserve allowed such
disturbances to exertapermanent effectonthe level ofmoneyandprices.
Overthe last 18 months, very rapid growth in M1
has been accompaniedby relatively sluggishgrowth
in nominal income. This anomaly has led many to
conclude that the relationship amongMl, inflation,
and real income has broken down. In response to
this apparent breakdown, the Federal Reserve has
abandoned M1targeting as a guide to setting mone-
tary policy. This de-emphasis of M1 comes after a
ten-year period during which monetary policy was
predominantly framed in terms ofgrowth ranges for
Ml.
The purpose ofthis article is to assess the impact
of monetary policy on inflation during the period
from 1976 to 1984. Monetary policy was criticized
during this period both by those who opposed
monetary targeting and by those proponents of
targeting who opposed the Federal Reserve's toler-
ance offrequent, and frequently large, deviations of
Ml from target. Some critics have argued that the
Fed's procedure for dealing with those deviations
contributed to both higher and more volatile infla-
tion. These criticisms are empirically evaluated in
this article.
The next sectioncontains a discussionofboth the
Fed's procedure for setting monetary targets and the
criticisms levied against that procedure. In Section
II, we formulate a simple structural model linking
output, prices, interest rates, and money, and dis-
cuss four hypotheses concerning the relationship
between money and inflation that should be true if
the criticisms were valid. The empirical methods
used to evaluate these hypotheses are also pre-
sented. Section III consists of an evaluation of the
empirical evidence, and Section IV provides a brief
summary of the findings.
I. Monetary Targeting Since 1976
Targetgrowthranges for various monetary aggre-
gates have been publicly announced by the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal
Reserve Systemsince the passageofHouseConcur-
rent Resolution 133 in 1975. From the first quarter
of 1976 until the passage of the Full Employment
and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 1, the FOMC
announced a target growth rate range for each
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monetary aggregate every quarter that would apply
over a four-quarter period.
This target range was calculated from a base
equal to the average level ofthe aggregate during the
previous quarter. Thus, in February 1976, the
FOMC set a target range of4Y2 to 7 percent for Ml
growth to apply to the period from 1975Q4 to
1976Q4; the range was calculatedfrom a base equal
to the average level of M1 in the fourth quarter of
1975. Three months later, the FOMC announced
another four-quarter target range, in this case 4Y2Base Drift
The successive gray lines representing the mid-
pointofeach target cone show that the procedure of
Figure 1
Base Drift Illustrated
percent to 7 percent again, to apply tothe period
1976Ql to 1977Ql. The base for this target range
was the averagelevel ofMl during 1976Ql.
This method ofsetting the target growth paths for
monetary aggregates leads to upward or downward
shifts in those paths depending on how Ml deviates
from the midpoint ofits target range. A succession
ofhypothetical target ranges is illustrated in Figure
1. Assume that in period 1, a target range of3 to 7
percent growth is set, with actual Ml in period 0
used as the base. This target range is represented by
the cone emanating from the actual Ml value at the
end ofperiod 0 (point A in the figure). Suppose the
actual path of Ml during period 1 is given by the
solid line so that at the end ofthe period, actual M1
is given by point B. As drawn, actual Ml ended
within the targetcone, butabove the midpoint ofthe
cone represented by the dashed line.
In period 2, the FaMC would establish a new
target growth rate range, say 3 to 7 percent again,
and base the new cone on actual M1 at the end of
period 1. The new target cone in the figure therefore
has its apex at point B. If the solid line were to
represent the actual path followed by M1, subse-
quent hypothetical target ranges for periods 3 and 4
would be as depicted.
M1
o 2 3 4
Periods
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usingactual Ml as the base foreach cone causes the
bas.e to driftupward ordownward according to MI's
deviation from the midpoint of any target growth
cone. Such base drift has characterized the method
ofcalCulating growth targets for M1and the broader
monetaryaggregates; at the beginningofeach target
period, the base for the new growthrange has shifted
to equal the actual level ofmoney at the end ofthe
previous target period. Base drift makes deviations
ofactual money from the midpoint path permanent
at the end ofeach target period.
To eliminate the automatic occurrence of base
drift each quarter, the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of
1978 required the FaMC to establish, in February
of each year, target growth ranges for the entire
calendar year. This new procedure in effect replaced
automatic quarterly base driftwith automatic annual
base drift. That is, each February, the FaMC would
establish target ranges for the fourth quarter of the
previous year to the fourth quarter of the current
year, calculated from a base equal to the average
value of the aggregate in the fourth quarter of the
previous year. Thus, in February 1979, the FaMC
announced a target range of 11 12 to 4Y2 percent
growth for M1starting from the actual value ofM1
in 1978Q4.
According to the new procedure, the FaMC also
reviews its target ranges at mid-year and can adjust
either the base or the target growth rate ranges. For
example, in July ofboth 1983 and 1985, the FaMC
responded to rapid M1 growth during the first six
months of the year by using second quarter Ml
(instead of fourth quarter Ml from the previous
year) as its new base for calCulating growth paths
and by adjusting the growth rate ranges.2
Chart 1 provides an estimate of the cumulative
effect of base drift during the period 1976Q1 to
1985Q4byplottingboth actual M1and a hypotheti-
cal target path that incorporates changes in the
target range midpoint while maintaining actual M1
in 1975Q4 as the base. The latter series, labeled
"No drift Ml", shows what the path ofMl might
have been if Ml growth had always been at the
midpoint ofthe FaMC's target ranges and no base
drift had been allowed. By the end of1984, accord-
ing to the No drift Ml series, actual Ml was roughly
15 percent higher than it would have been if it had
always grown at the midpoint of the successive
target growth rate ranges.Chart 1









There is, however, an important reason for
thinking that Chart 1 may not give an accurate
pictureofhow Ml would have behaved iftheFOMC
had followed a policy ofpreventing base drift. Ithas
been claimed that under the federal funds operating
procedure followed prior to October 1979, the Fed
allowed the money stock to respond to movements
in income, interest rates, and inflation. Under a
different monetary policy, such as one that did not
tolerate base drift, the actual behavior of these
macroeconomic variables would most likely have
been different. This means that the FOMC might
have set different target ranges ifit had eliminated
base drift rather than followed its policy ofallowing
complete base drift.
Criticisms of Base Drift
The FOMe has frequently been criticized for
allowing money growth volatility and base drift to
occur. Automatic base drift implies that the growth
ofthe money stock will have no tendency to return
to a constant trend. Thus, a policy that allows
automatic base drift would seem to be inconsistent
with a goalofzero inflation. Ithas beenclaimedthat
base drift hinders the achievement of both stable
money growth and stable prices over longer periods
by making permanentany short-rundeviations from
target that occur at the end ofeach target period.
Broaddus and Goodfriend (1984) discuss three
major objections to base drift. First, they argue that
base drift reduces the public's confidence in the
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Fed's commitment to maintaining a stable, steady
expansion of the money supply over the long-run.
Second, by automatically "forgiving" any target
misses, they claim base drift greatly reduces the
incentives for the Fed to hit its targets. Missing a
target in one year imposes no penalty on the Fed in
subsequent years since each year automatically
starts on target. Third, by incorporating temporary
disturbances that cause money to deviate from tar-
get, they believe base drift gives those disturbances
a permanent effect on the money stock and, there-
fore, the price level. This leads to increased uncer-
tainty about the future price level and reduces oneof
the advantages ofmonetary targeting.3
At the heart of these criticisms is the belief that
the policy followed by the FOMC contributed both
to raising average inflation over the ten years of
monetary targeting and to increasing the volatility
of inflation.
This criticism is not necessarily valid, however,
since one can argue that some deviation from the
midpoint target path and subsequent base drift is
justwhat one shouldexpectto observe ifthe FOMC
is concerned about stabilizing inflation. For exam-
ple, suppose velocity grows faster than expected
during a year. Ifthe Fed wishes to preventsuch arise
from leading to higher inflation, it must reduce
money growth. Consequently, the actual level ofthe
money supply at the end ofthe year would be below
the level implied by the midpoint target path set at
the start of the year.
How should the target growth path for the next
year be set? The answer to this question turns out to
depend on the perceived persistence ofthe velocity
disturbance. Suppose the unexpectedly rapid
growth in velocity were temporary, with velocity
growth returning to its trend value in subsequent
years. The result of a one-year surge in velocity
growth is to leave the level ofvelocity permanently
higher, as illustrated in Figure 2 by the line ABCD.
For a given path of money, such an upward shift in
velocity will lead to a similar upward shift in the
price level, thus generating higher inflation during
the transition to a higher price level.
Higher inflation could be avoided if the path of
the money supply were permanently lowered. In
such a case, the FOMC should not use the midpoint
ofits prior year target range a..<; the base for the nextFigure 2
A Surge in Velocity Growth Can Leave





year's range because this will not produce the
required lowering ofthe path for money. Instead, the
new base should be set at a lower level. Since actual
money was assumed to come in below target, the
actual level ofthe money supply may provide a new
base that would be more consistent with the preven-
tion of a temporary increase in inflation.
A possible alternative path for velocity after an
initial surge in its growth is labeled ABCEF in
Figure 2. On that path, faster velocity growth is
followed by an offsetting period of slower growth
that returns the level of velocity to its original path
(AF in the figure). In this case, no permanentadjust-
ment in the level of the money supply is needed to
prevent inflation. If the actual level of the money
supply were used as the new target base, the target
growth rates would have to be temporarily increased
for the money supply to return to its original path.
Such situations would result in a negative correla-
tion between deviations from target midpoints and
the target growth rates set for the following year as
deviations of the money supply below the target
path are followed by higher target growth rates
designed to return the money supply to the level of
the original path. 4
Evaluation
This discussion suggests that the impact of M1
deviations from the target midpoint growth path on
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inflation will depend on the reasons for the devia-
tion. On the one hand, such deviations might arise
because the Fed allows the money stock to respond
to income, interest rate, or inflation movements
caused by disturbances to the economy. As was
pointed out in the discussion of a velocity distur-
bance, the appropriate monetary policy response
depends crucially on the nature of the initiating
disturbance. Shocks likely to persist call for a dif-
ferent policy response than do more transitory dis-
turbances.
On the other hand, some MI target misses may
represent the effectsofmoney stockcontrol errors or
policy actions unrelated to income, inflation, or
interest rates. Such money supply disturbances will
change output and inflation; they represent an inde-
pendent source of inflation volatility that can be
attributed to monetary policy.
To evaluate the impact of monetary policy on
inflation, then, it is necessary to answer two ques-
tions. First, have money supply disturbances been
an important source ofinflation volatility? Second,
has the induced policy response ofthe money sup-
ply to economic disturbances contributed to the
inflationary impact of such disturbances? If the
answerto these questions is "yes", and the behavior
ofthe money supply during the period ofmonetary
targeting has contributed to inflation uncertainty
and volatility, the following four stylized "facts"
should characterize the data:
1. Money supply disturbances should account
for a significant fraction of the volatility of
inflation;
2. Changes in money growth should lead to
subsequent movements in the rate of infla-
tion;
3. Knowledge ofmoney growth should help to
forecast future inflation;
4. Temporary spending or money demand dis-
turbances should lead to persistent, or per-
manent, responses ofthe money supply.
The data should have the first three ofthese four
characteristics ifindependent money supply distur-
bances arising from policy shifts or from the failure
to control the money supply were importantcontrib-
utors to inflation volatility. The fourth characteristic
would be true ifthe Fed has responded to economic
disturbances in a manner that has contributed toraising the average rate ofinflation.
To determine whetherthese stylizedfacts holdfor
the U.S. during the periodofmonetary targeting, it
is necessary to translate each into a statistical
hypothesis that can be tested. This translation will
be done within the context of a simple structural
model linking money with other macroeconomic
variables. This model is discussed in the next sec-
tion.
II. Empirical Framework
This section discusses an empirical framework
that can shed light on the criticisms levied at the
FOMe's conduct ofmonetary policy. The model to
be examined consists offour variables: real GNP in
1982 prices, the GNP price deflator, the three-
month Treasury bill rate, and MI. (All observations
are quarterly.) Because most macro variables are
nonstationary, the analysis is carried outin terms of
first differences. Let Yt, Pt, and Mtdenote the first
differences ofthe logofreal GNP, the pricedeflator,
and Ml, respectively. Thus, Y, P, and M are approx-
imately equal to the quarterly growth rates of out-
put, prices, and money respectively. Let Rt denote
the first difference of the level of the bill rate. All
variables are expressed at seasonally adjusted
annual rates.
A simple four-equation model was used to cap-
ture the structural relationships assumed to hold
among the equilibrium values ofthese macro vari-
ables. The first equation is a simple IS, oraggregate
spending, relationship that assumes real aggregate
spending depends on the anticipated real rate of
interest. This is represented by equation I:
where EtPt+ I is the expectation of Pt+I' so that
Rt+Pt- EtPt+ I is the expectedreal rate ofinterest,
and Wit_ I is a composite term that incorporates all
the dynamic effectsofpastvalues ofincome, prices,
interest rates and money on Yt. Since an increase in
the expected real rate of interest should reduce
aggregate spending, al should be negative. The
disturbance term uIt will be referred to as an aggre-
gate demandshock; itcaptures all contemporaneous
effects on Ytother than those operating through the
real interest rate.
The second structural equation is a simple Phil-
lips curve or aggregate supply relationship;
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(2)
Again, W2t- 1 captures the effects of all lagged
values and so would also incorporate the impact on
Pt of expectations of Pt formed in earlier periods.
The coefficient a2 should be positive, as, ceteris
paribus, a rise in output should lead to a rise in the
price level. The disturbance term U2t represents an
aggregate supply shock.
The third structural equation in the model spec-
ifies the demand for real money balances as depen-
dentonincome and the nominal interest rate as well
as on lagged values ofthe variables in the model:
For the purpose of estimation, this equation is
normalized on the interest rate and written as
Sincearise in outputshouldincreasethe demandfor
real money balances whereas a rise in the nominal
rate shouldreduce it, we expecta3tobepositiveand
a4 to be negative. The disturbance term u3t repre-
sents a money demand shock.
The final equation of the structural model is a
description of money supply determination:
Equation 4 relates the money supply to the contem-
poraneous valueofnominal incomeand the nominal
interest rate. As in the other equations, W4t- 1
captures any lagged effects on money supply. Ifthe
Federal Reserve slows money growth when nominal
income growth increases, as would be negative.
However, Fedcritics have oftenchargedthat the Fed
allows money growth to vary procyclically. Thiswould suggest that as may be positive. Since it is
also often claimed that the Fed "leans against the
wind" by attempting to smooth interest rate move-
ments, a6 would be expected to be positive. The
term U4t represents a money supply shock; it incor-
porates all contemporaneous influences on the
money supply except the influences of nominal
income and interest rates.
This structural model allows money supply
effects to operate through three channels. First, U4t
represents monetarydisturbances thatdirectly affect
the money supply and, through the presence ofM in
equation 3, interest rates, output, and prices. Sec-
ond, aggregate spending, aggregate supply, and
money demand shocks will affect nominal income
and the nominal rate of interest, and thereby cause
the money supply to respond endogenously, as long
as as and a6 in equation 4 are not both zero. Third,
lagged values of the money supply will also have
effects on current output and prices. Empirical
estimates of these various channels can be used to
shed light on the stylized facts listed in the previous
section.
Statistical Hypotheses
Within the context of the model described, styl-
ized facts numbers I and 2canboth be interpreted as
statements about the effects ofmoney supply distur-
bances on inflation. Evidence that money supply
shocks accountfor a large fraction ofthe variance of
inflation would support "Fact" 1. Likewise, "Fact"
2 would be supported by evidence that a nonzero
realization ofthe money supply shock led to subse-
quent movements in inflation.
To cast light on stylized fact 3, the four structural
equations can be solved to express Yo Po Rt and Mt
as functions ofthe lagged values ofthese variables
andthe currentvalues ofthestructural disturbances.
"Fact" 3 can then be interpreted as a statement
about the coefficients on past values of M. If the
coefficients on lagged M in the equation for infla-
tion are jointly zero, then knowledge ofpast money
supply growth rates does not help in forecasting
inflation once past inflation, output, and interest
rates are taken into account. Hence, nonzero coeffi-
cients on past M would provide evidence in favor of
"Fact" 3.
Evidence relevant for judging "Fact" 4 can be
obtained by determining how the money supply
responds to disturbances to the model. Since distur-
bances in the structural model are assumed to be
serially uncorrelated, a finding that temporary
shocks to, for example, money demand had per-
sistenteffectsonthe moneysupply and prices would
indicate that the induced response of the money
supply to economic conditions was leaving lasting
effects on prices and contributing to inflation as the
price level adjusts.
Although it will be argued below that "Fact" 3 is
the least interesting ofthe three stylized facts, it is
the easiest to test since an estimate ofthe effects of
lagged M on P can be obtained by directly regress-
ing P on lagged values ofM, Y, P, and R. However,
to assess "Facts" 1, 2 and 4, it is necessary to
recover information on the true structural distur-
bances, and this requires first estimating the ais that
characterize the contemporaneous relationships
among Y, R, P and M.s
III. Empirical Results
The empirical results reported here are all based
on the sample period 1977Q1- 1984Q4. This period
encompasses several changes in Federal Reserve
operating procedures, the most important of which
was the move, in October 1979, from a federal funds
operating procedure to a nonborrowed reserves pro-
cedure. The Fed's commitment to monetary target-
ing also seems to have varied over this period.
Unfortunately, the shortness of the sample period
precludes dealing adequately with these potential
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structural shifts. Nevertheless, estimates derived
from the whole sample may still provide useful
information about the average impact of monetary
shocks.6
Estimated values of the parameters giving the
contemporaneous relationships between Y, R, P,
and M in the structural model are listed in Table 1.
All parameter signs agree with prior expectations,
and, with the exception ofthe real interest elasticity
of aggregate spending (aI), all the parameters areParameter Estimate for Structural Model
TABLE 1
*These are asymptotic standard errors; see Hansen and Singleton
[1982] for the appropriate formula.
statistically different from zero at conventional sig-
nificance levels. Of particular interest is the esti-
mated equation for the money supply - equation 6.
The negative estimated value of as - the coeffi-
cient on nominal income - indicates some endo-
genous policy response within the quarter to offset
contemporaneous movements in nominal income.
However, thevery largecoefficientestimatefor 0.6 is
evidence ofatendency to attempt to offset nominal
interest rate movements.
The estimated variances of the structural distur-
bance terms allow some conclusions to be drawn
about their relative importance in generating eco-
nomic fluctuations. In decreasing order of size are
the variances ofaggregate spending shocks, which
are estimated to be more than twice as large as any
of the other variances, money supply shocks,
money demand shocks, and aggregate supply
shocks. This ordering is somewhat at variance with
the traditional Federal Reserve view that empha-
sizes the importance of money demand shocks.
However, U3 was the disturbance for a money
demand equation normalized on the interest rate.
When converted back to the standard form of a
money demand equation, the estimated variance is
.00052. This results in a ranking that seems consis-
tent with the Federal Reserve view.
The estimated coefficients of the structural
model, together with the results of the vector auto-
regression (VAR) estimation technique used to esti-
mate the effects of lagged variables on Y, R, P and
M, can be used to study the impact ofmoney on the
macroeconomy during the period of monetary tar-
geting. In particular, it is possible to examine the
stylized facts about monetary policy that were dis-
cussed in Section II.
If independent monetary volatility has contrib-
uted to the volatility of inflation, then one should
expect to find that money supply disturbances, as
identified in the structural model, accountfor alarge
fraction ofthe variance oferrors made in forecasting
future inflation. Table 2 presents the decomposition
of the forecast error variance for inflation. Each
column reports the fraction of the total variance of
the inflation forecast error that is attributed by the
structural and VAR estimates to a particular struc-
tural disturbance. 7 Results for various forecast hori-
zons ranging from one quarter to 24 quarters are
reported.
The clear conclusion from Table 2 is that money
supply disturbances contribute very little to infla-
tion uncertainty as measured by the variance of




































Variance Decomposition of Inflation
Aggregate Aggregate Money Money
Quarter Spending Supply Demand Supply
1 24.15 75.78 0.03 0.04
4 18.64 73.42 6.35 1.59
8 22.66 65.19 9.16 2.99
12 22.41 64.96 9.34 3.29
24 22.18 64.36 10.04 3.43
IIdecomposition suggests that the first of the four
stylized facts discussed in Section II is not an
accurate description of the money supply-inflation
relationship during the period of monetary target-
ing.
To gaugewhether shocks to the supply ofmoney
lead to subsequent movements in the rate of infla-
tion __ stylized fact 2 - the VAR and structural
modelestimates canbeused to calculate the impact
ofa money supplydisturbancebothdirectly oneach
ofthe model's variables and indirectly through the
induced effects of changes in one variable on the
others. Table 3 presents the responses of all four
variables in the model to a money supply distur-
bance.
The immediate impact of a positive shock to the
growth rate of the money supply is a decline in
market interest rates, a rise in real output growth,
and an increase in the rate ofinflation. However, the
impacton the rate ofinflation is very small, peaking
6quarters afterthe shock to money growth, and then
declining. This evidence, which is consistent with
the variance decompositions reported in Table 2,
suggests that money supply disturbances do not
have large effects on subsequent inflation. As the
last column ofTable 3 shows, the small impact is in
large partdueto the temporary nature oftheeffectof
money supply shocks on the rate of growth of the
money supply.
An alternative way to assess the impact ofmone-
tary changes on future inflation involves testing
whether information about past money growth rates
is helpful in predicting the rateofinflation once past
inflation rates, output growth rates, and nominal
interest rates are known. 8 In essence, such a test
examines whether monetary changes precede
changes in inflation. The structural model is not
needed to carry out such a testsince, as explained in
Section II, the test involves only the statistical
significance of the coefficients on lagged money
growth rates in the VAR equation for the rate of
inflation. The relevant F-statistic for this test is 0.30
with a marginal significance level of 87 percent.
Thus, the data are quite consistent with the hypoth-
esis that money does not help to forecast inflation.
This testresult, however, is notparticularly useful
for evaluating the contribution of money supply
disturbances to the level and volatility of inflation.
For example, the evidence that past money growth
does not aid in forecasting inflation once past infla-
tion, real output growth, and nominal interest rates
are known is entirely consistent with the hypothesis
that monetary shocks have a largecontemporaneous
impact on inflation. It is also consistent with the
view that nonmonetary disturbances have been the
cause ofmost inflation fluctuations over the period
studied.
The results in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that money
supply disturbances do not constitute an important
sourceofindependentvariation in inflation. Yet this
result in still consistent with the criticism that the
FOMe has let the money supply respond endo-
genously to interest rates and income in a manner
that has led to more inflation than would have
occurred under a policy that eliminated such
induced movements ofthe money supply. To assess
TABLE 3




































*AII entries have been multiplied by 100.
12this criticism, itis necessary to examine the manner
in which the money stock responds to the other
disturbances inthemodel. The response ofthe level
ofMtoeachofthevarious structural disturbances is
reported in Chart 2.
Several interesting conclusions areapparentfrom
Chart 2. Panel A shows the response ofthe level of
the money supply to an aggregate spending distur-
bance. Initially, the money supply responds
positivelyto a spendingincrease, butthis is reversed
by the end of four quarters. The net effect of the
aggregate spending shock is toleave the level ofthe
money supply lower than it would have been in the
absence ofthe positive spendingshock. The pattern
ofresponse to an aggregate supply shock, shown in
Panel B, is similar. The net effect of an aggregate
supply shock on the level of the money supply,
however, is more than offset within a year. Even-
tually, the.path of the money supply appears to
return to what it would have heen inthe absence of
the shock.
InPanel C, the response ofthe money supply to a
money demand shock is illustrated. A positive
money demand disturbance induces an increase in
money growth that appears to be fairly quickly
reversed. Attheend offive quarters, the level ofthe
money supply is back to where it would have been
had it remained on its initial path.
Chart 2
Response of Money to Various Shocks
C. Money Demand Shock x10-3
2
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01--0+------------In none of these first three panels is there evi-
dence thataggregate spending, aggregate supply, or
money demand shocks induce permanenteffects on
either the growth rate ofthe money supply, oreven
the level of the money supply, that would produce
sustained inflation.9
Panel D paints a somewhat different picture. A
positive shock to the money supply is not com-
pletely offset afterward. Instead, the shock leaves
the nominalmoneysupply permanentlyhigher. This
implies that money supply disturbances do seem to
have the effect of permanently raising the price
level, and, during the transition to a higher price
level, producing an increased rate ofinflation. This
evidence is consistent with Table 3 which showed
that money supply shocks led to a period of tem-
porarily higher inflation. Because these shocks are
never offset, the price level is left permanently
higher.
One interpretation of these results is that the
FOMC lets temporary errors in its control of the
money supply result in permanent changes in the
price leveL This interpretation supports the crit-
icism of automatic base drift - that base drift
converts temporary deviations (due to control
errors) from the target path into permanent devia-
tions ofthe price level from the path consistentwith
a constant rate ofinflation.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
This article has examined the relationship
between the money supply and inflation during the
period from 1976 to 1984 when monetary policy
was generally framed in terms of target growth
ranges for MI. The major criticisms ofthe Federal
Reserve's loosecontrolofthe money supply focused
on the implications ofmoney growth for inflation.
To assess the empirical validity ofthese implica-
tions, evidence obtained from a vector autoregres-
sion and an estimated structural model was
employed. The empirical sections of the paper
examined the impact of money supply shocks on
subsequent in~ation, the fraction ofinflation fore-
cast error attributable to money supply shocks, the
contribution ofpast money growth to the forecast of
inflation, and the induced response of money to
aggregate spending, aggregate supply, money
demand, and money supply disturbances.
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In general, little evidence was found to indicate
that money supply disturbances have independently
made a majorcontribution to the level ofinflationor
its unpredictability. However, it does appear that the
FOMC has allowed random disturbances in the
growth rate of the money supply to exert a perma-
nent effect on the level ofmoney and prices. Faster-
than-expected money growth generates temporarily
higher inflation that leaves prices permanently
higher. Such a finding is not surprising given the
FOMe's policy of automatic base drift, in which
deviations of the money supply from target are
allowed to affect the level of the money supply
permanently. However, given the short sample
period and the changes in Federal Reserve operat-
ing procedures that occurred in 1979 and 1982,
these conclusions must be considered tentative.FOOTNOTES
1. This Act is better known as the Humphrey-Hawkins Act.
2. Each year, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis pub-
lishes in its Review an analysis of the FOMC deliberations
on setting targets during theprevious year.
3. The Shadow Open Market Committee (1985) has
recommended the elimination of base drift. See also M.
Friedman (1982, 1985) and McCallum (1984). In one of the
earliest attacks on base drift, Poole (1976) suggested, as
an alternative procedure, that the midpoint ofthe previous
year's target range, and not actual M1, be used as the new
base. This recommendation was also proposed in the
1985 Economic Report ofthe President.
4. In fact, this correlation is positive. For a more detailed
analysis of base drift, see Walsh (1986).
5. Actual estimation proceeds in two steps, If Zt is the
column vectorofY" Pt,Rt,Mt,then the structural model can
be written as AZt = B(L)Zt_1 + ut· Hence, Zt =
A-1B(L)Zt_1 + A-1ut D(L)Zt_1 + vt. The lag coeffi-
cients in D(L) can be obtained in the first step from estima-
ting a vector autoregression (VAR) in Zt. This also yields
estimates of vt.A lag length offourwas used in the VAR and
each equation also included aconstant and atimetrend. In
the second step, an estimate of A was obtained by noting
that the population covariance matrix of v is A- 12:uA- l'
where 2:u = E(u'u) and applying aGeneralized Methods of
Moments estimation procedure. For further discussion of
this approach, see Bernanke [1986] or Sims [1986]. The
Generalized Methods of Moments estimator is discussed
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in Hansen and Singleton (1982) and Chamberlain (1984).
The strt,!ctural disturbances can then be recovered as AVt
where A is the estimate of A and v t is the vector of VAR
residuals. See also Walsh [1987).
6. In Walsh (1987), the mOdel was expanded to include a
measure of the Fed's M1 target and a dummy vari<iple for
the period 197904 to 198203, when the Fed used a
nonborrowed reserves operating procedure. This slight
change in the specification had a large impact on the
estimated dynamics implied by the VAR system. Points
where the results of this paper differ from those of walsh
(1987) are noted in footnote 9.
7. Unlike standard methods of orthogonalizing the VAR
residuals to construct variance decompositions, the
approach taken here, which combines a VAR with a struc-
tural model, yields results that are independent of the
ordering of the variables. Thus, the fact that money supply
shocks are listed last in Table 2 has no significance.
8. This is just atest of the null hypothesis that money does
not Granger cause inflation.
9. Somewhat different results were obtained from an
extended model that included a dummy variable for
197904 to 198203. In this model, aggregate supply
shocks appear to produce a permanent increase in the
rate of money growth. This indicates that the endogenous
Federal Reserve policy response contributed to the infla-
tionary impact of aggregate supply disturbances. See
Walsh, (1987).REFERENCES
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